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Michael A. REYNOLDS, Shattering Empires. The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman
and Russian Empires, 1908-1918. Cambridge–New York : Cambridge University Press,
2011, XIV-303 p.
1 Michael Reynolds’ impressive new study recounts the grinding Russo-Ottoman struggle
in Anatolia and the Caucasus during the Great War that ultimately contributed to both
empires’  collapse.  More  important,  Reynolds’s  account  reframes  radically  and
persuasively many longstanding assumptions about the relationship between the war
and imperial collapse. Questioning the longstanding axiom that both states fell victim
to  modern  nationalisms  that  sundered  outdated  imperial  regimes,  he  traces  their
“shattering”  to  a  vicious  circle  entrapping  each  of  them.  By  the  early  twentieth
century,  Ottoman and Russian statesmen faced the two-sided challenge of  domestic
transformation through new forms of statecraft in order to uphold their security and
survival in a remorselessly competitive international environment. These efforts, and
the perspectives they sprang from, fell fatally short as they catalyzed the collapse they
had sought to forestall.
2 Shattering Empires follows the careers of  the Russian and Ottoman states during the
years after 1908-1918,  a period of domestic crisis,  war,  and collapse in both.  In the
Ottoman Empire,  domestic reconstruction took on even more sweeping dimensions.
The  Young  Turks  who  took  power  in  1908  – largely  to  forestall  the  seemingly
impending loss of  Macedonia – sought the creation of an assertive state,  capable of
mobilizing  the  population  and  revenues  necessary  to  arrest  the  depredations  of
Ottoman territory and sovereignty by the Great Powers, not least Russia, and the new
Balkan states formed by their one-time subjects. Following military defeat by Japan and
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constitutional reforms brought on by the revolution of 1905, Russian statesmen sought
social renewal, economic expansion and rearmament as necessary conditions for what
P.A. Stolypin called a “Great Russia.”
3 These  transformative  programs  drew  on  European  methods  of  governance,  which
emphasized  the  use  of  a  rationalizing  and  assertive  state  to  create  loyal  modern
subject-citizens and encourage economic growth, both of which could be efficiently
mobilized  in  defense  of  national  security.  The  Young Turks’  practices  imposed  the
state’s  direct  presence  in  areas  –  most  notably  eastern  Anatolia  –  long  governed
through  the  mediation  of  local  notables.  This  approach  to  governance  also
incorporated a  distinctive –  and implicitly  subversive  –  European understanding of
nationality as the normative basis for statehood, a view dating at least to the Greek war
of  independence  in  the  1820s.  The  Treaty  of  Berlin  had  implicitly  sanctioned  the
nation-state as the normative political unit, while establishing the welfare of so-called
minority populations as an issue of international interest. These new norms brought
unhappy  consequences  for  the  Ottomans,  with  recurrent  interventions  in  the
Armenian, and Macedonian “questions,” as well as the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, which
saw  the  international  acceptance  of  mass  population  transfers  based  on  ascribed
national belonging. To create an Ottoman nationality, the Young Turks sought to foster
civic identification with the empire, downplaying the centrality of older confessional
distinctions. Within Russia, the issue of national belonging emerged by the eve of the
Great War itself, as older, inclusive notions of imperial loyalty were supplanted by the
promotion  of  an  increasingly  exclusive notion  of  Russianness,  even  as  “state”  and
“society” pursued a persistent political struggle over prerogative and legitimacy in the
post-1905 order.
4 The  Ottoman  and  Russian  programs  for  domestic  strengthening  and  mobilization
depended, however, on the absence of international threat. The Young Turk revolution
produced the opposite effect, provoking a series of challenges to international stability,
beginning with the Bosnian crisis and Bulgarian independence in 1908, followed by the
Balkan Wars, which also brought Russian security into question, as the German Empire
became an increasingly supportive partner of the Ottomans.  Reynolds argues – pace
Sean McMeekin’s recent Russian Origins of the First World War1 – that Ottoman leaders
chose in October 1914 to join the Central Powers in war against Russia, expecting quick
victory and the elimination of the most immediate threat to Ottoman security. This
strategic calculation led instead to a draining conflict between the two eastern empires
along a front stretching across eastern Anatolia, the southern Caucasus and along the
Russian-occupied Persian borderlands.
5 As the war demonstrated, the attempt to mobilize national identity could also be used
against one’s adversaries. Reynolds documents Ottoman and Russian efforts to mobilize
the “tribes” or “nationalities” in enemy territory against  their  Muslim or Christian
overlords.  The  Russians  funded  Kurds  or  Armenians,  while  the  Ottomans  offered
support to Muslim Azeris and Caucasian mountaineers. Yet, as Reynolds emphasizes,
each  side  subordinated  these  subversive  efforts  to  the  primary  security  aim  of
establishing firm and viable strategic buffers against future threats from the other. By
the  same token,  the  mass  population transfers  legitimized during  the  Balkan Wars
could become an instrument of domestic security policy, as illustrated most egregiously
in 1915, when Talat Pasha ordered mass deportations of Armenians in eastern Anatolia.
This tragedy owed as much to concerns for the security of borderlands inhabited by an
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untrustworthy minority population as to a genocidal hatred for Armenians as such –
 the statecraft that privileged quantification and rational resource allocation helped
make genocide possible.
6 The  Russian  revolutions  of  1917  complicated  the  Ottomans’  strategic  goals,  while
demonstrating their geopolitical foundations. At Brest-Litovsk and during the Russian
Civil War, the Turkish government championed the self-determination of Ukrainians
and Caucasians, seeking bulwarks against the re-emergence of a powerful Russia. For
their part, Russian commanders on the Caucasian front envisioned the seizure of large
tracts  in  eastern  Anatolia  as  a  block  to  future  Turkish  expansionist  designs.  The
subsequent  Bolshevik  leadership  made their  own appeals  to Ottoman non-Turks  in
pursuit of security as much as proletarian internationalism. By the early 1920s, older
notions  of  empire  in  both  states  had  given  way  to  radically  different  foundational
principles – the supranational “class” aspirations of the Soviet state, on one hand, and
the ardently Turkish nation-state imagined by the now-ascendant Mustafa Kemal, on
the other.
7 Reynolds’s account fills an important lacuna in western historical scholarship on the
Great War and the shattering of the two eastern land empires in the European state
system.  The Russo-Turkish struggle  has  only  recently  begun to  attract  attention in
English-language scholarship, including Mustafa Aksakal’s Ottoman Road to War in 1914,
Ronald Bobroff’s Roads to Glory and Sean McMeekin’s more problematic study, as well as
Peter Holquist’s work on the Russian occupation of Anatolia.2 With its strong command
of Ottoman and Russian archival materials, Reynolds’s work presents a rare comparison
of  the  two  empires’  common  dilemmas  before  the  challenges  of  domestic  and
international  insecurity.  Given  his  training  as  an  Ottomanist,  Reynolds  pays  closer
attention to  that  empire than to  Russia,  for  which the Ottoman conflict  posed less
direct threat than the war against the Germanic empires to the west. One might also
note  that  the  domestic  disruptions  produced  by  state-sponsored  transformation  in
response to apprehended international threats formed a motif for each empire’s history
after the Crimean War, which had brought the Ottoman Tanzimat and Russia’s “Great
Reforms.” This cavil aside, Shattering Empires offers a cogent and well-made reminder to
historians of  modern Europe that  the domestic  challenges facing the Romanov and
Ottoman  empires  arose  from  the  imperatives  of  foreign  policy  as  the  impetus  for
domestic transformation, rather than from awakening nations rising to claim their own
states.
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